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Abstract 
How do two central institutional subsystems of democracy – party systems and civil society – affect 
the persistence of democratic regimes? Despite the ability of each of these institutions to provide 
sources of countervailing power that make politicians accountable and thus responsive, 
distributionist accounts of democratic breakdown provide few insights on how such institutions may 
encourage parties to reach accommodation. We argue that these institutions provide credible threats 
against anti-system activities that would otherwise threaten the democratic compromise. We test our 
argument with newly available data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project by analyzing 
all episodes of democratic breakdown from 1900-2001. Using a split population event history 
estimator, we find evidence that these institutions not only forestall the timing of breakdowns 
among transitional democracies but also that a strong party system is critical to setting democratic 
regimes on the path of consolidation. 
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Introduction 
How do two central institutional subsystems of democracy – party systems and civil society – affect 
the persistence of democratic regimes? If like Dahl, we understand democracy as a system of 
government that in comparison to other forms of rule is more responsive to the preferences of 
citizens, then the ability of citizens to steer the political system to provide a set of acceptable 
outcomes is an essential part of maintaining an effective and legitimate government. Civil and 
political societies play several essential roles in this process. First, they are sites through which citizen 
preferences are formulated and aggregated. Second, these are the realms via which citizens overcome 
collective action problems and through which representation is secured. Finally, through both 
resistance to state actions and the contesting of elections, they are sources of countervailing power 
that make politicians accountable and thus responsive.  
Despite this, recent distributionist accounts do not foreground the role of institutions. At one 
extreme Przeworski has gone so far as to claim that institutions are endogenous. He suggests that 
they are merely a product of the same material and sociological conditions that explain democracy 
(Przeworski, 2004, pp. 531-2). Such claims are not outlandish given many of the early null findings 
on the subject of institutions and survival built on works as foundational as Linz work on the perils 
of presidentialism for democratic breakdown (1978) and Sartori’s work on the centrifugal effects of 
polarized pluralism (1976), also see Linz 1978). Attempts to test the impact of presidentialism or the 
large numbers of parties associated with polarized pluralism on democratic survival only infrequently 
and inconsistently attain levels of conventional significance. The collective weight of these studies 
leads to the conclusion that these particular institutions are irrelevant to survival in general but may 
matter contingently in very specific contexts  ( Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Sing, 2010; Aleman & 
Yang, 2011; Bernhard, Nordstom &Reenock 2001; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; 
Cheibub, 2007; Madea 2010; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2014; Svolik, 2008; Lai & Melkonian-
Hoover, 2005; Sing 2010). 
Our approach to the question of how institutions shape democratic survival builds on earlier 
attempts to situate the role of institutions in easing distributional dilemmas. We focus on how two 
institutional subsystems—the party system and civil society—shape the ability of actors to hold each 
other accountable for attempted defection from democratic norms and practices. Existing work on 
party systems and democracy have tended to focus on the number of parties as a proxy for 
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polarization, with the mixed results described above. However, we argue that other dimensions of 
the party system, namely, the degree of party system institutionalization, bear much more directly on 
the ability of actors to overcome commitment problems. Where civil society has been included in 
discussions of democratic longevity it has tended to focus on the roles social mobilization and social 
capital. We build on this work to argue that perhaps civil society’s greatest positive impact on 
democratic survival comes when it serves as a credible threat against attempts to undermine 
democracy.  Our contribution is to move away from individual institutions and focus on larger 
meso-level institutional subsystems and focus on how they help to foster the conditions that make 
adherence to the democratic rules of the game self-enforcing (Przeworski, 1991). (North, 
Summerhill, & Weingast, 2000). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss how institutions affect the 
capacity and incentives of actors to overcome the collective action problems inherent in democratic 
government. We then discuss how the party system and civil society shape the actors’ ability to 
overcome commitment problems, and thus affect the probability of democratic durability. We then 
discuss our empirical strategy for testing out hypotheses, including the use of a novel dataset from 
the newly available V-Dem project on civil society and party systems. Finally, we discuss our 
findings and their implications.  
Institutions and Collective Action Problems 
One of the chief ways institutions are hypothesized to affect democratic longevity is by providing 
actors the means to overcome collective action problems. Specifically, institutions are expected to 
shape actors’ capacity to overcome bargaining, monitoring and coordination problems. Standard 
distributional models of regime instability, for example, emphasize that the foundation of 
democratic durability is stable bargains between citizens and the elite, and between different factions 
within the elite. In such models, bargaining failure between competing parties is a fundamental 
trigger for regime collapse. Whether competition occurs between elite coalition members or between 
elites and citizens, bargaining failures over rent distribution, public goods or tax burdens can raise 
potential threats to a regime’s tenure (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Przeworksi 2005; Svolik 2012). 
With respect to democratic regimes, divergence between actors’ policy preferences and the lack of 
credible threats to punish potential defectors from the democratic compromise are both linked to 
regime fragility.  
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For example, by reducing preference divergence, both higher income levels (Przeworski, 2005) and 
moderating income inequality (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2002) have the potential to ease 
the prospect for bargaining failures. As incomes rise and relative income disparity wanes, the set of 
jointly preferred policy options between competing actors grows, incentivizing stable democratic 
outcomes. As differences in preferences converge and the bargaining space between parties 
increases, actors find themselves better able to tolerate the policy choices of others.  
The potential for a sustained democratic outcome, however, is also conditional on whether actors 
have credible threats to impose costs on other actors for defection. The most common 
conceptualization of these punishment mechanisms is the governing party’s threat to repress or the 
opposition’s threat to rebel. When such threats are sufficiently credible, actors’ expected utility of 
pursuing anti-system tactics decline. 
Curiously, early on, these distributional models of democratic durability were relatively silent on the 
role of institutions in encouraging stable regime outcomes. Indeed, Przeworski (2005) rather 
controversial claim that outside of their use in declaring the winner of an election that ‘institutions’ 
were unnecessary to secure the democratic compromise is emblematic. This view of institutions and 
regime stability flew in the face of the earlier theories that emphasized the value of particular 
institutions in prolonging both autocratic and democratic regimes. Early analytic models often made 
assumptions about the informational environment, the availability of punishment mechanisms and 
the fixed nature of collective action and coordination dilemmas that did not allow a role for 
institutions.  
More recent work has begun to consider precisely how institutions might affect regime dynamics. By 
altering the distribution of power, improving the informational environment, providing credible 
threats or resolving coordination dilemmas, certain institutions may enhance the potential for 
cooperation among actors party to the democratic compromise. Important work has been done in 
this regard in thinking about the role of legislatures under electoral autocracy. Legislatures can either 
act as forums to negotiate policy concessions that can coopt or, at least, keep opposition political 
forces quiescent (Ghandhi 2008), or they can aid in resolving informational problems between elite 
coalitions and the autocratic incumbent (Boix and Svolik 2014). From both of these perspectives, 
the nominally “democratic” institution of a legislature acts as a prophylactic against autocratic 
collapse.  
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Under democracy, institutions can have similar beneficial effects for regime survival. Federalist 
systems, for example, may provide insulation to vulnerable minority groups or regional elites, 
thereby enhancing the prospects of securing a stable democratic outcome (Boix 2002) (North, 
Summerhill, & Weingast, 2000). Independent courts may buttress the democratic compromise. By 
resolving fundamental monitoring and coordination activities between winners and losers, 
independent courts can signal when a violation of the democratic compromise is legitimate, thereby 
avoiding unnecessary threats to the democratic regime’s survival (Reenock, Staton and Radean 
2014).  
In a similar way we argue that institutionalized party systems and robust civil society offer important 
safeguards against anti-system activity. Building on this literature we contend that when contending 
elites and the organized citizenry are able to credibly threaten sanctions against anti-system behavior 
this makes the democratic compromise self-enforcing. We highlight the role of civil society and 
party systems as key. Lying at the nexus of elite-citizen relationships that party systems and civil 
society, separately and jointly, affect the ability of citizens and elites to credibly threaten sanction 
against potential democratic defectors. They are essential to establishing “credible bounds on the 
behavior of political officials” with regard to the democratic political order (North, Summerhill, & 
Weingast, 2000, p. 24). Our argument extends the logic of this reasoning by arguing that that the 
establishment of such credible bounds goes beyond constitutions, rights, and a sense of legitimacy 
(though the first two are necessary and the third helps to ease the burden of establishing such 
bounds) by introducing the deterrent capabilities of counterelites and organized publics into the 
calculus of what produces durable democracy. 
Party Systems 
A number of scholars have drawn a direct connection between party system institutionalization and 
the consolidation or survival of democracy. In institutionalized party systems parties have strong, 
stable bases of support, robust party organizations, and party labels that are distinct and valuable to 
both voters and candidates.1 By contrast, weakly institutionalized party systems are characterized by """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
1 The existing literature defines institutionalization in a variety of ways—though Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) 
definition remains the most influential. The common elements of these definitions include the following (Hicken and 
Kuhonta 2014): Stability of interparty competition, parties viewed as legitimacy by major actors, value infusion, and 
organizational routinization. For our purposes value infusion and organization routinization are of the greatest interest. 
For more on how to define institutionalization see, for example, Huntington 1968; Welfing 1973; Panebianco 1988; 
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fleeting parties which lack stable bases of support and enter and exit the system frequently. Within 
these ephemeral parties, organization is weak and party platforms are poorly articulated and 
indistinct. Why would we expect the level of institutionalization to be causally linked with 
democratic survival? To date, two general arguments have been advanced in the literature.  
The first highlights the role of parties as both the symbols and machinery of democracy. Parties in 
institutionalized systems provide a stable means for channeling the interests of social groups and a 
collective way for citizens to hold government vertically accountable. Where parties fail to perform 
these functions, as in less-institutionalized party systems, disillusionment and disaffection with both 
political parties and with the democracy itself is often the consequence.2 This can open the door for 
anti-system forces, including the military or populist politicians (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; 
Schamis 2006; Roberts 2007; Kaufman 2008; Ufen 2008; Doyle 2011).3  
While party system institutionalization may not be necessary for the democratic consolidation (Toka 
1997; Markowski 2001) the presence of institutionalized parties seems to increase the chance of 
democratic consolidation (Dix 1992; McGuire 1997; Wallis 2003; Lewis 2006) and decrease the 
chance of democratic breakdown (Skatch 2005; Ufen 2008). Basedau (2007) and Basedau and Stroh 
(2013) dissent from this position, failing to find a strong relationship between institutionalization 
and democratic stability. Others have argued that the relationship between institutionalization and 
consolidation or stability is non-linear. Starting at a low level an increase in institutionalization 
increases the prospects for democracy. However, beyond a certain point greater institutionalization 
becomes “partyarchy” (Coppedge 1994) and can actually undermine democratic stability (Stockton 
2001; Roberts 1998; Bertoa 2009).  
A second set of scholars considers the indirect effects of party system institutionalization on 
democratic stability. Led by Mainwaring (1998; 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006) this work 
establishes the correlation between the level of institutionalizations and the quality of democracy. 
Higher levels of institutionalization are associated with a higher quality of democracy while low 
levels of institutionalization are associated with low quality democracies (Osei 2012; Kneuer 2013; 
Reidl 2014). Relatedly, a number of studies associate institutionalization with better democratic """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" "
Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svasand 2002; Ufen 2008; Hicken 2011; Hicken and Kuhonta 
2014.   
2 Doyle, for example, finds that low levels of party system institutionalization is associated with greater support for anti-
system populist candidates (2011). 
3 Weyland (2009) notes that many of these studies face serious endogeneity challenges. 
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governance, including more programmatic representation, greater stability of interests, better 
accountability, and more attention to public goods (e.g Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Tóka 1997).  
Our argument is closest to the democratic disillusionment story, but rather than focusing on the 
support for democracy among citizens, we are concerned with the potential constraints on would-be 
anti-democratic defectors. The argument, stated simply, is this -- leaders in institutionalized party 
systems are more like to face organized opposition if they begin to retreat from fundamental 
democratic principles compared to leaders in weakly institutionalized systems. Party leaders in 
institutionalized systems, with their reliable bases of support, robust organizational capacity, and 
longer time horizons have the capacity and incentive to overcome collective action problems in 
response to attempts by their opponents to defect from the democratic bargain. The form of this 
organized opposition can be both electoral and extra-electoral. From the perspective of a would-be 
defector in an institutionalized system, the likelihood of strong, organized opposition from partisan 
opponents is much more likely to represent a credible threat. It increases the expected costs of 
defection, while decreasing the probability that such a move will succeed. In short, the expected 
utility of trying to subvert democracy should be lower, ceteris paribus, in institutionalized party 
systems. 
By contrast, the expected costs of defection for leaders in weakly institutionalized systems is much 
lower. Leaders in such systems are more likely to face weaker opposition with rampant intra-party 
collective action problems, short time horizons, indistinct messaging, and reputation shortfalls. As a 
result parties fail to present a credible threat to a leader contemplating a retreat from fundamental 
democratic principles. Or, stated differently, the expected utility of defection is higher in weakly 
institutionalized party systems, ceteris paribus. 
To summarize, if party system institutionalization allows for electoral sanction against aggressive 
anti-system tactics, then leaders, in expectation of oppositional electoral pressures, will be less likely 
to pursue such tactics. Leaders in under-institutionalized party settings, facing a less well-organized 
and identified opposition, are less likely to face credible countervailing pressures. As a result they 
will be less likely to be constrained from taking anti-system measures. Oppositions will be similarly 
affected. When party system institutionalization is strong, oppositions have an incentive to pursue 
policy change via systematized electoral competition. Due to the strong expectations of electoral 
punishment, oppositions will be less likely to pursue anti-system tactics. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, 
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party system institutionalization ought to be positively related to parties’ incentives to respect the 
democratic compromise.  
Civil Society 
Like party system institutionalization, civil society is a complex concept with multiple dimensions. 
We understand civil society as “an organizational layer of the polity that lies between the state and 
private life. Civil society is composed of voluntary associations of people joined together in common 
purpose...” in pursuit of civic goals (V-Dem, 2014, pp. 183-184). To elaborate – civil society is 
regulated by the state, but must be sufficiently autonomous from it. The absence of such autonomy 
abrogates its existence. The fully etatized top-down forms of social organizations common in many 
authoritarian regimes are not civil society but transmission belt organizations that allow the state to 
control society. Civil society is populated by groups of citizens organized to act in pursuit of 
common goals and interests. Such civil society organizations (CSOs) include interest groups, labor 
unions, social movements, professional associations, welfare organizations, etc. They are 
distinguished from political society (organizations primarily focused on contesting and taking state 
power) and organized private activity (e.g. spiritual or economic).4   
There are two basic approaches in the literature to the issue of civil society and democracy, the neo-
Weberian and the neo-Tocquevillian. Both suggest that a more developed civil society should 
promote democracy, though there is some dissent from this consensus. They are also distinct in that 
the former is a structural/institutional theory and the latter, cultural. The return of civil society as an 
important concept in comparative politics was sparked by the reemergence of resistance to harsh 
forms of dictatorship by popular movements and organizations in the 1970s. Early neo-Weberian 
proponents of the concept included Jacques Rupnik (1979) and Andrew Arato (1993) in their 
analyses of political opposition in communist Poland, and Alfred Stepan (1985) who applied the 
concept to resistance to the military regime in Brazil. The idea of social mobilization as a critical 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
4 Several kinds of organizations should not considered part of civil society:  (a) forced membership organizations in 
etatist regimes, (b) public or private firms, (c) churches or other institutions devoted to the practice of spirituality, and 
(d) criminal organizations. These exclusions do not mean that groups associated with firms (owners or workers) or with 
religious life cannot found civic associations. Obviously, if they do, they are considered part of civil society. Thus we are 
not excluding trade unions, industrial lobbies, or organizations that follow religious teachings as a motivation for civic 
engagement. With regard to religious organizations – saving souls is private; social engagement is civic. Religious inspired 
groups who pursue public policy in line with their beliefs are clearly part of civil society. With regard to economic 
activity – production is private; union or industry lobby activities to affect public policy are part of civil society. 
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moment in democratic transition was also taken up later by prominent theorists of regime change as 
well (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986)  (Przeworski, 1991). 
After transition, an active and organized civil society is essential to checking prerogative state power 
and keeping politicians accountable to the electorate and aware of social pressure between electoral 
episodes (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Ekiert & Kubik, 1998). A great deal of work has been done on the 
weakness of civil society in the postcommunist region as a potential threat to sustained democracy in 
the region (Howard, 2003; Bernhard & Karakoç, 2007; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2013).5  However, 
there is no consensus regarding the salutary effects of civil society on democracy. A number of 
authors have talked about how highly mobilized civil societies in particular cases can provide a 
means for authoritarian challengers to undermine and weaken democracy or even use civil society 
organizations to take control of the state (Berman, 1997; Chambers & Kopstein, 2001; Riley, 2010).  
The origins of the neo-Toquevillian school lies in the civic culture tradition (Almond & Verba, 1963) 
and the study of the impact of political values and attitudes on democracy. The key transitional 
figure in the move from civic culture to civil society in this tradition is Putnam who demonstrated a 
link between associational life, trust, and what was first labelled social capital in his study of regional 
differences in Italy (1993). Whereas, Putnam himself has rarely used civil society as a central 
concept, preferring to talk about civic engagement and the building of social capital and community 
(Putnam R. D., 2000), others building on his work have readily done so (Skocpol, 2011; Newton, 
2001; Edwards & Foley, 1998).6 Associational life, an active and dense civil society, is seen as 
producing interpersonal trust and other forms of social capital which promote democratic 
performance and longevity. Within this line of inquiry there are dissenters as well, who argue that 
the causal connections specified are spurious and thus cast doubt on the connection between culture 
and democracy, and argue that the causal direction runs from democratic institutions to trust 
(Encarnación, 2003; Seligson & Mueller, 1994; Rothstein, 2005). 
Despite ongoing disputes over the role of civil society in the maintenance of democracy, the weight 
of opinion argues that its impact is positive. We will seek to show that a civil society that is 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
5 Ekiert and Kubik dissent from this view and point to Poland as a case where a mobilized civil society has worked as 
surrogate for a political society that was weak and perennially crippled early in the post-transition phase of 
democratization. 
6 Also see, for example, the articles in Skocpol and Fiorina (1999). Others active in the values and democracy literature 
such as Ronald Inglehardt and Christian Welzel have also been reticent to fully embrace the language of “civil 
society”(2005). 
11""
unencumbered by repressive state regulation and in which citizens are engaged has an overall 
positive effect on the duration of democratic regimes despite the small number of well-documented 
cases in which civil society mobilization has played a role in democratic breakdown. We believe that 
the effect will be overwhelmingly positive in the preponderance of cases. However, it is possible that 
an over-mobilized civil society in the absence of a well-institutionalized party system to channel its 
activism in a constructive direction may complicate the matter (Berman, 1997; Huntington, 1968). 
Such considerations also open up the possibility that the relationship between democratic stability 
and the strength of civil society may be non-linear, with both low and high levels of strength posing 
a threat (piece which Chris read and we talked about). 
Like our argument about party systems, we are concerned with the way that civil society might act as 
a constraint on leaders who are tempted to defect from democratic norms and ideas. Our argument 
proceeds as follows. Highly developed civil societies offer the potential for popular social 
engagement. From a neo-Weberian perspective, higher levels of social engagement in politics 
provide popular pressure on political elites and state officials. The presence of this popular pressure, 
whether real or potential, incentivizes democratic leaders and oppositions to work within the 
democratic framework to resolve their policy differences. Under such systems, there exist credible 
threats against possible violations of fundamental democratic principles. In the absence of this 
credible threat, one or more actors may find the allure of pursuing anti-system tactics sufficiently 
attractive, putting the democratic compromise at risk. From a neo-Tocquevillian perspective civil 
society should both build trust and political competence facilitating the ability of competing elites 
and the governed to resolve bargaining dilemmas. In either case, ceteris paribus, robust civil society 
ought to be positively related to actors incentives to respect the democratic compromise. 
Empirical Analysis 
Exploration of the link between party systems, civil society and democratic durability has been 
hampered up to now because of the difficulty of collecting cross-national data on these areas of the 
polity over a long period of time. However, because of the new data available through the “Varieties 
of Democracy” project, this is now possible. V-Dem data on party institutionalization and civil 
society is available for all states from 1900 to 2012 – more on these data below.  
Our empirical strategy, then, is to isolate the effect of civil society and party institutionalization, 
using these V-Dem measures, on democratic regime stability. To this end, we will examine these 
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relationships in the context of event history analysis, modeling a democratic regime’s hazard of 
experiencing breakdown as a function of civil society and party institutionalization and a set of 
controls. We will consider both standard event history estimators as well as split population event 
history estimators that allow us to decompose the influence of covariates on both the likelihood that 
a regime is consolidated and on the timing of breakdowns among transitional regimes (Svolik 2008). 
In our set up, we will consider every democratic regime from 1900 to 2001. We begin in 1900 due to 
the data availability on the V-Dem measures. We end in 2001 not due to any data constraint but 
rather to allow us to directly compare our findings with those of Svolik (2008). We use the 
democratic regime event history dataset by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) to classify the onset and 
collapse of our democratic episodes. Democratic regimes that break down prior to 2001 are coded 
as reversals, and those that experienced no breakdown by the end of our temporal window are 
coded as right censored. In this subset of the data, we have 3157 country years of data, with 167 
episodes of democracy, 60 of which end in breakdown. 
Estimation 
To estimate our models we will use both standard and split-population event history estimators. The 
standard estimator presumes that all democratic episodes are vulnerable to experiencing a 
breakdown and models the effect of covariates on this likelihood. We employ two standard 
estimators: the Weibull and Log-log parametric models. The Weibull model assumes a monotonic 
baseline hazard rate and possesses the proportional hazards property, where the effect of a covariate 
induces a change in the hazard that is proportional to baseline hazard and this change is presumed to 
be constant over time. The Log-log parameterization is more flexible in that it allows for non-
monotonic hazard rates and avoids the proportional hazards assumption. We will estimate both of 
these models with a Gamma shared frailty parameter to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
across repeated observations. 
The split population estimator is Svolik’s split population event history model (2008). It, as well, 
includes both a Weibull and Log-log parameterization of the survivor distribution. This splitting 
estimator does not assume that all democratic episodes are vulnerable to a breakdown. Rather it 
assumes that the population of democratic episodes consists of two subsets: consolidated 
democracies and transitional ones. The power of such splitting estimators is to allow the analyst to 
assess the distinct impact of covariates on each of these processes by estimating each process jointly. 
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The result is to estimate two models. The first characterizes the effect of covariates on the timing of 
breakdown among transitional regimes. The second characterizes the effect of covariates on the 
probability of democratic regime being consolidated.  
In our case, the benefit of this splitting estimator is that it will allow us to assess whether civil society 
and party institutionalization resources help consolidate democracies, better insulate transitional 
democracies from breakdown, or both. 
Main Variables 
Here we review the operationalization and measurement of our key independent variables and 
discuss our research strategy. Our variable Party System Institutionalization or PSI is an index of 5 
indicators from V-Dem dataset, and is designed to capture the extent to which party systems are 
characterized by parties with distinct programmatic identities, strong ties to groups of voters, and 
robust organizations. (This corresponds with the internal dimension the PSI concept—see Hicken 
2014.) The 5 indicators are as follows:  
• Party organizations (v2psorgs): How many political parties for national-level office have 
permanent organizations? 
• Party branches (v2psprbrch): How many parties have permanent local party branches? 
• Party linkages (v2psprlnks): Among the major parties, what is the main or most common 
form of linkage to their constituents? 
• Distinct party platforms (v2psplats): How many political parties with representation in the 
national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are 
publicized and relatively distinct from one another? 
• Legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv): Is it normal for members of the legislature to 
vote with other members of their party on important bills? 
We operationalize civil society using an index of indicators from the V-Dem data, called the Core 
Civil Society Index (CCSI). CCSI was designed to measure the robustness of civil society, 
understood as the extent to which civil society organizations can organize free of constraints by the 
state and the extent to which the citizenry actively involved in participation in civil society 
organizations.  
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We measure this as an index of the following three V-Dem indicators: 
• CSO Repression (v2csreprss): Does the government attempt to repress civil society 
organizations (CSOs)? 
• CSO Entry and Exit (v2cseeorgs):  To what extent does the government achieve control 
over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life? 
• CSO Participatory Environment (v2csprtcpt):  Which of these best describes the 
involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)? 
 
Factor analysis reveals that PSI loads on these five indicators and CCSI loads on these three 
indicators. The indices consist of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis (BFA) that has 
then been converted to a normal cumulative density function. Each of these variables has been 
scaled from 0 to 1 to ease interpretation. 
Figure 1 below displays two panels for each variable across the democratic regimes in the data that 
never experience a breakdown and those that do. Critical for our application, is the variance in both 
of these institutions among these sets of democracies. 
The panels display the distribution across these cases. Each of the variables are left-skewed for both 
sets of regimes, with most democracies clustering at fairly highly developed civil societies and 
institutionalized party systems. For democracies that never experience a breakdown, the mean value 
civil society is .856 with a standard deviation of .132, while the mean value for party 
institutionalization is .815 with a standard deviation of .128. There is considerably more variation in 
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the data among those democracies that have experienced a breakdown. For democracies that have 
broken down, we see, predictably, the mean value of civil society is lower at .662 with a standard 
deviation of .175, while the mean value for party institutionalization is .672 with a standard deviation 
of .158.  
We should also note that the pattern of these data is one where the variance is cross-sectionally 
dominant rather than within the democratic episode. For the large majority of cases civil society and 
party institutionalization are democratic resource that take shape at the beginning of an episode, 
partially shaped by their authoritarian legacies (Bernhard & Karakoç 2007; Hicken and Kuhonta 
2014; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens 1994) and partially shaped by dynamics of their 
transitions. On average, the relative size of the between democratic episode variance to the within 
democratic episode variance is on the order of 4.64x larger. This is a stark difference when 
compared to the variance of GDP per capita among our democratic episodes. GDP per capita is 
more balanced, with a slightly greater within episode variance by a ratio of 1.08. As a result, the 
variance that we will exploit in this investigation is that which varies between our democratic 
episodes. 
Identification 
Before moving on to the multivariate analysis, we consider here two additional concerns. Can the 
relationship between civil society, party institutionalization and regime survival be identified? We 
believe that it can be. First, theoretically, these institutional resources experience natural breaks with 
their past at the point of a democratic transition. While not a perfect discontinuity, they are perhaps 
the closest that we may see in international observational data.7 The nature of party politics during 
authoritarian interludes can also shape the party system that follows after a transition to democracy. 
Decisions by autocrats—whether to outlaw all parties, form a new ruling party, or coopt existing 
parties—can cast a shadow that extends beyond the democratic transition and influence the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
7 Under extreme forms of authoritarianism, like communist post-totalitarianism we see party-states enforcing a 
monopoly of political organization (Howard 2003), whereas under more conventional authoritarian regimes we see more 
toleration of social pluralism but repression precluding the kind of political pluralism that leads to democratic 
responsiveness (Linz & Stepan, 1996). With liberalization and relaxation of repression in the classic model of transition 
we see the (re)emergence of civil society (Przeworski, 1991) (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). There are also patterns 
where the mobilization of previously dormant civil societies in what turn out to be the late stages of authoritarianism 
play a crucial role in the opening of democratizating sequences as well (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Adler & Webster, 
1995; Bernhard, 1993) (Fernandes, 2015). Following such phases party system (re)emerge as elections are put on the 
table or restrictions of parties are removed under forms of electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2013; Reidl 2014). 
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probability that institutionalized parties emerge under democracy (Geddes and Franz 2007, Hicken 
and Kuhonta 2014). Last, as we note above we see little within case variation in either party 
institutionalization or civil society over the length of a typical democratic episode, limiting the 
potential case the hazards that a regime may face will in turn influence either of these institutions.  
Second, might these data series be driven by economic development? Perhaps. Let’s consider this 
possibility. We first considered the zero order correlations of civil society and party 
institutionalization with GDP per capita over the entire democratic episode data. These correlations 
are .46 and .53, respectively. These relatively high correlations suggest that perhaps wealth is indeed 
a driving force behind the development of these institutions. But what of their dynamic relationship? 
We know from above that civil society and party institutionalization vary little within a democratic 
episode and that wealth, on average, exhibits a strong positive trend. How then do these correlations 
vary over the lifetime of the average democracy? Early, in a democracy’s life, the correlations 
between wealth and our institutions are much weaker. In fact, in the first year, they are .11 and .38 
respectively. These positive correlations slowly grow over a democratic episodes tenure.  
Figure 2 below illustrates nicely a few common patterns in these data. We consider the democratic 
episodes of Chile (1932-1973) and Ecuador (1979-2000). Each of the series display the within case 
stability for civil society and party institutionalization that we observe among most democratic 
episodes. Each of these cases be in with civil society and party institutionalization at relatively high 
levels, particularly for developing democracies, and remain there for the duration of the episode. 
The Chilean case also demonstrates the familiar pattern that we see between development and our 
two institutional variables. Early in the series GDP is relatively lower despite civil society and party Figure"2."GDP,"civil"society"and"party"institutionalization"over"time"for"Chile"and"Ecuador"
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institutionalization being relatively more developed. As the country’s economy grows over the next 
four decades we might expect a stronger correlation between GDP and these two measures. Last, it 
is important to note that each of these episodes ended in Democratic breakdown. However, 
compared to other cases a breakdown in our data, these two cases endured relatively long before 
there democratic collapse and possessed relatively higher investments in civil society and party 
institutionalization, offering suggestive evidence that these institutions may have provided decades 
worth of insulation from potentially destructive anti-system elements. 
We can also consider the relative distribution each of our institutions with GDP per capita across 
instances of Democratic breakdown. Figure 3 below displays this relationship for civil society and 
party institutionalization.  
Overall we see the moderate correlation between each institution and wealth, with the standard 
hockey stick relationship displayed. Important for our argument is that instances of democratic 
breakdown must not be clustered randomly across each of these institutional features. Rather, we 
would expect to see a relative absence of democratic breakdowns on the far right-hand side of the 
graph, particularly for those cases at or above the mean on both civil society and party 
institutionalization. Indeed, we see descriptive evidence of this relationship. We see hardly any cases 
of breakdown at sufficiently high levels of society and party institutionalization, even among 
relatively poor states. We should note that this relationship is not quite as strong for party 
institutionalization, given that we do not observe relatively poor states with extremely strong party 
institutionalization. The effects of these institutions do not seem to be completely captured by a 
democracy’s economic development. The overall pattern offers suggestive support for our 
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argument— civil society and party institutionalization would appear to be offering some element of 
protection against anti-system forces. 
Evidence from Multivariate Analysis  
Before presenting the results of the multivariate analysis, we first display to Kaplan-Meier plots for 
civil society and party institutionalization, respectively. We coded each variable into quartiles and 
then estimated the survival function of our democratic regimes. Figure 4 below displays these plots 
for each quartile of the variables. Without any additional controls, civil society and party 
institutionalization appear to contribute to the survival of a democratic regime. Those democracies 
with the lowest resources to draw on within each of these institutions, represented by the first and 
second quartiles in the plots, find themselves exposed to risk and, accordingly, rapidly exit the data 
set. For those democracies with higher endowments on these institutions, they appear to be offered 
some protection against shorter lifespans. The pattern displayed in the plots suggest that civil society 
may be slightly more protective than a well-developed party system, given that we see hardly any 
exits from the data set was sufficiently high civil society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All of the evidence presented above offers support to our account that a robust civil society and a 
well-developed party system may act as a check against anti-system forces that may threaten to 
destabilize democracy. But of course, we must control for a variety of potential intervening variables 
Figure"4."KaplanRMeier"Survival"Estimates"for"Civil"Society"and"Party"Institutionalization"
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that may lead us to falsely reject the null hypothesis. To do this we will estimate our standard and 
split population event history models with our institutional variables and a set of controls. 
As noted above, to take advantage of the V-Dem long temporal coverage and to be able to compare 
our results against a base model, we use Svolik’s (2008) data on control variables. To control for 
economic development and growth we use Madison’s Historical Statistics (2003) to assess both 
annual GDP per capita (in thousands) and annual GDP growth. In addition to these economic controls 
we also control for the effect of political institutions. These include a series of dummy variables that 
capture whether democracy had a Presidential or Parliamentary system. Each of these dummy variables 
is compared to base category of having a mixed system (again, per Svolik). And whether the 
Democratic episodes authoritarian legacies had any differential effects on their relative survival. 
These dummy variables code whether the authoritarian government prior to the democratic episode 
was headed by the Military, Civilians, or a Monarchy. Each of these dummy variables is compared to 
the base category of a country not having been independent prior to the transition. 
Standard Models 
Table 1, below, displays the models from the standard event history estimators. The Weibull 
parameterizations are displayed in the first two columns and the Log-Log parameterizations are 
displayed in the second two columns.  
Each of the base models yield results similar to Svolik’s (2008) standard models. The estimates are 
not exact given that our time period only picks up in 1900. However compared to Svolik’s simple 
Log-Log estimation, the inferences are the same: GDP per capita GDP growth and having a military 
legacy all influence democratic reversals in the expected direction. As a base of comparison for our 
institutional effects below, it is useful to discuss the size of the insulating effect of wealth on the 
relative hazards of breakdown. The results above suggest that an additional $1000 in GDP decrease 
the relative hazard by 30%. 
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The civil society and party 
institutionalization variables are 
statistically significant in each of 
the estimations and have relatively 
strong effects on democratic 
regime survival. The maximum 
effect of civil society moving on 
the V-Dem scale from 0-1, will 
reduce a democracies relative 
hazard of breakdown by 99.06%. 
A more reasonable substantive 
effect might be enhancing civil 
society by .2 on our 1 to 0 scale. 
Such a chance would induce a 
60.6% reduction in the hazard of 
breakdown – nearly equivalent to 
the effect of $2000 additional 
dollars of GDP. 
The maximum effect of a democracy having an institutionalized party system, moving on the V-
Dem scale from 0-1, will reduce a democracies relative hazard of breakdown by 97.74%. A more 
reasonable substantive effect might be enhancing party structures by .2 on our 1 to 0 scale. Such a 
chance would induce a 53.1% reduction in the hazard of breakdown – again slightly less than an 
equivalent effect of adding $2000 to GDP. 
A quick side note before we move to the split population models. In each of the models above 
where we estimate the effects of civil society and party institutionalization on democratic regimes 
stability, the previously significant effect a military legacy of authoritarianism is now null. We believe 
this is due to the fact that democratic regimes extracting themselves from military authoritarian 
legacies are less likely to begin their democratic experience with robust civil societies and well-
developed party institutions (see Geddes and Franz 2007 and Hicken and Kuhonta 2014). In fact, 
civil society (-.288) and party institutionalization (-.314) are moderately negative correlated with 
previous military legacy. By including these newly available measures in a standard model democratic 
Base C.S +P.I. Base C.S +P.I.
Reversals
Civil Society ----- 0.0094 *** ----- 3.2646 ***
----- 0.0060 ----- 0.647998
Party Inst. ----- 0.0226 *** ----- 2.2347 ***
----- 0.0235 ----- 0.615919
GDP per capita 0.6303 *** 0.7001 *** 0.3166 *** 0.1507 ***
0.0910 0.0921 0.0600 0.0576
GDP growth 0.9505 *** 0.9437 *** 0.0353 *** 0.0428 ***
0.0127 0.0166 0.0087 0.009567
Military 3.8779 *** 2.0965 -0.5607 * -0.4690
1.7904 1.2377 0.3305 0.3043
Civilian 1.2695 1.2542 -0.1199 0.0593
0.6206 0.5242 0.3848 0.340294
Monarchy 1.0714 0.7186 0.0106 0.2614
0.9315 0.4911 0.6320 0.46434
Parliamentary 1.1834 0.9424 -0.1145 0.1487
0.7060 0.5201 0.4229 0.31925
Presidential 1.2418 0.6054 -0.0926 0.1850
0.6238 0.3188 0.4096 0.328573
--- ---
Constant 0.0174 *** 3.2807 2.6887 *** -0.9467 *
0.0111 2.8296 0.5740 0.507668
Weibull Shape Parameter (p) 1.30 *** 1.5305 *** ----- -----
Log-Log Shape Parameter (p) ----- ----- 0.6210 *** 0.6210 ***
Frailty Variance 1.73 *** 1.39 *** 1.31 *** 0.6160 ***
AIC 287.50 202.91 285.48 205.14
BIC 342.01 269.53 339.99 271.77
Failures 60 60 60 60
Episodes 149 149 149 149
Cases 3157 3157 3157 3157
Note: Weibull coefficients are hazard rates. Log-Log coefficients are accerlerated failure time. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
Table 1. Democratic Survival by Civil Society and Party Institutionalization
Weibull Models Log-Log Model
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survival, we have unearthed a potential explanation to the relatively robust finding in the literature 
that military legacies have negative impacts on democratic regimes. 
Split Population Models 
To this point in the analysis we have assumed that every democratic regime is a transitional one, 
exposed to a potential risk of democratic collapse. Svolik (2008) demonstrated that such an 
assumption is tenuous, finding strong evidence that democracies split into consolidated and 
transitional regimes, with the former having low risks of experiencing transition. 
To consider this possibility we estimated split population Weibull parameterization. We first 
estimate a model that replicates Svolik’s analysis and then estimate a second model which includes 
our measures of civil society and party institutionalization. The reversals model is parameterized as a 
Weibull with time-varying covariates. The consolidation model is parameterized with a logistic link 
function.  
The models are reported in Table 2 below. The first column reports the results of a base model, 
while the second includes our two institutional measures. The base model is largely similar to that 
reported by Svolik (2008). His analysis suggested that economic growth was the main driving force 
behind the timing of democratic reversals and that wealth and having a military legacy with the main 
drivers behind whether a democracy was considered to be consolidated. Despite our analysis being 
run on a different time period, 1900 to 2001, our results are quite similar in both statistical 
significance and substantive impact. 
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The second column reports the results from including the civil society and party institutionalization 
variables as covariates in the reversal and 
consolidation models. Perhaps the greatest 
change between the base model and the model 
in which our institutional variables are included 
is that there is no longer any evidence that 
GDP per capita drives the consolidation status 
of democracy.  
Given the robustness of the relationship 
between level of development and democratic 
survival in previous work, this is a shocking 
finding. Given that our first model replicates 
Svolik’s finding, albeit on a smaller sample, we 
conclude that the failure of development to 
attain significance in the second model is a 
product of incorporation of our institutional 
variables into the regression. Given the low 
correlations between CCSI and PSI and 
development reported above, we do not think 
this is an issue of simple collinearity.  
For now we treat this finding as intriguing but 
tentative. As this line of research is only in its 
beginning stages we need to do more analysis 
of the question, paying careful attention to 
design, model specification, and time period 
effects before making overarching claims on 
the basis of this one finding. While these 
results are intriguing, it is incumbent on us to demonstrate the robustness of this finding before 
making any major claims against what has been seen as one of the most unimpeachable and robust 
findings in the survival literature. 
Base C.S. + P.I.
Reversals Model
Civil Society ----- 2.4124 ***
----- 0.5271
Party Inst. ----- 1.7313 ***
----- 0.5532
GDP per capita 0.0490 0.0502
0.0924 0.0922
GDP growth 0.0491 *** 0.0400 ***
0.0191 0.0116
Military -0.4411 -0.5169 **
0.3612 0.2374
Civilian 0.1160 -0.0441
0.3571 0.2769
Monarchy 0.6994 0.3657
0.5871 0.4178
Parliamentary -0.5334 -0.1303
0.3557 0.2870
Presidential 0.2324 0.3171
0.3034 0.0431
Intercept 2.4118 *** 0.2024
0.4195 0.5276
Shape Parameter (p) 2.4470 *** 1.7530 ***
0.7740 0.2610
Consolidation Model
Civil Society ----- 1.3238
----- 3.5124
Party Inst. ----- 16.7715 **
----- 7.6917
GDP per capita 2.5659 ** 0.6264
1.0386 0.4449
GDP growth 0.2585 0.1620
0.2528
Military -4.3113 * -0.4670
2.3040 1.4170
Civilian -0.5366 -0.6958
1.4624 1.3230
Monarchy -13.7609 -15.4194
614.9107 830.9160
Parliamentary 2.0938 0.9178
2.6010 2.9171
Presidential -9.7983 * -3.0887
5.6953 3.5163
Intercept -7.5553 ** -16.1176 ***
3.9407 6.0579
Frailty Variance 2.4020 0.0296
1.9280 0.1478
AIC 525.183 469.43
BIC 634.216 602.69
Failures 60 60
Episodes 148 148
Cases 3157 3157
Note:  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
Table 2. Democratic Survival by Civil Society and Party Institutionalization
(Weibull Parameterization)
Split Population Models
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With respect to our main variables of interest, we see two different patterns. First, both civil society 
and party institutionalization are statistically significant for the reversal model and have positive 
time-to-failure coefficients, suggesting that transitional democracies can draw upon these resources 
to stave off reversals. A transitional democracy with a more entrenched civil society and 
institutionalized party system is more likely to endure compared to those regimes that lack these 
resources. Second, party institutionalization also influences whether a democracy is transitional or 
consolidated. 
The substantive effects of these variables are quite strong. For the timing of reversals, we consider 
the substantive impact of enhancing each of our institutions by .2 on our V-Dem scales of 0 to 1 – a 
substantive change well within the core of our data. The analysis suggests that democracies with a 
more entrenched civil society (an additional .2 units) evidence a decrease in their baseline hazard of 
experiencing a reversal of -57.08% and enhances the regime’s survival time by 62.01%. The effect of 
party institutionalization on the timing of reversals is similar although slightly smaller in magnitude. 
The analysis suggests that democracies with a more institutionalized party system (an additional .2 
units) evidence a decrease in their baseline hazard of experiencing a reversal of -45.50% and 
enhances the regime’s survival time by 41.38%. 
To provide some perspective to the substantive effects consider the effect of economic growth on 
reversals. Our analysis suggests that an economic contraction of 10% in the year prior, increases the 
baseline hazard of experiencing a reversal by 101.62% and shortens the expected survival time by 
32.97%.  
Turning to the consolidation model, only institutionalized party systems appear to shape whether a 
democracy is likely to be consolidated. Civil society has no effect on how these regimes split in the 
data. Table 3 below displays the substantive effects of how varying levels of party institutionalization 
affect the probability of 
the consolidated 
democracy in the first 
year. With all the other 
variables held at the 
mediator modal values, a well-established and operational party system appears to offer strong 
information about whether a democracy is consolidated. However, this effect is nonlinear and has its 
Party Institutionalization Pr(Consolidated Democracy)
0.65 0.0143
0.75 0.0739
0.85 0.3053
0.95 0.7075
Notes: Estimates are calculated for other variables held at their median or modal values and for a democracy's first year.
Table 3. Probability of a Consolidated Democracy over Party Institutionalization
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strongest effects on enhancing a democracies consolidation prospects only at sufficiently high levels 
of institutionalization.8 
Concluding Thoughts 
The distributional model has brought notable advances to the study of regimes and regime 
transitions. With its econometric approach it has stressed the importance of structural conditions 
and has paid less attention to role that institutions play, especially in its accounts of the genesis and 
perpetuation of democratic forms of rule. This is also in part a product of the failure of early 
institutionalist explanations of democratic survival to produce consistent and robust findings in 
large-n testing despite well-formulated and reasoned theory. Recent forays into the importance of 
institutions for authoritarian regimes have reminded us of the potential importance of institutions to 
regime change and stability. In as much as institutions are the product of explicit human design and 
action, their incorporation into the literature provides a way to integrate the importance of human 
agency and decision-making into distributionist accounts. 
The collection of global data by the V-Dem project has provided us with an opportunity to integrate 
two institutional realms identified in meso-level literatures as important to democracy into a more 
global framework. We identified both civil society and the party systems as potentially crucial areas 
for democratic survival and theorized about why this might be so within the parameters of a 
distributionist framework for survival. The tests we framed have produced very encouraging results. 
In standard models using Weibull and log-log specifications we showed that both party system 
institutionalization and a developed civil society to be strong covariates of survival.  
In a split population model that examined the covariates of at-risk survival and consolidation 
separately, we found again that developed party systems and civil society insulated transitional 
democracies from rapidly breaking down. In terms of the consolidation model, looking at the 
covariates that insulate democracy from risk, party system institutionalization proves to be a 
significant predictor of consolidaton. Our findings suggest that a very strong level of party system 
institutionalization around the time of transition represents a very substantial advantage for 
consolidation. We were surprised by the dropping out of level of development once we include our """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
8 Note too, that the negative relationship between presidentialism and democratic consolidation in Svolik’s original 
model disappears we when we include PSI. This is consistent with an argument that the effects of presidential on 
democratic quality and consolidation flow through its effect on the party system (see Samuels and Shugart 2010). 
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institutional variables. In future work we will turn a great deal of attention to verifying and working 
to better understand this finding.  
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